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ABSTRACT
We examine quantitatively the extent to which financial distress in the 1990s affected employment
behavior in Japan. Based on the firm-level panel data that include small firms, we estimate dynamic
labor demand function, taking the impact of financial distress on employment into consideration.
We find that the firm’s ratio of debt to total asset exerts a significantly negative effect on
employment of small firms. We also find that employment of small firms is sensitively affected by
lending attitude of financial institutions.
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1.Introduction      
It is often argued that massive debt outstanding in the corporate sector and the 
associated bad loan problems in the banking sector are the main cause of long stagnancy 
of the Japanese economy in the 1990s. Theoretically, financial distress exerts a negative 
effect on the real economy through a variety of channels.   
First of all, it is well known that the balance sheet conditions of debtors affects the 
cost of external funds when there is asymmetric information between debtors and 
creditors. The cost of external finance is higher than that of internal finance, reflecting 
several factors including the creditor’s cost of collecting the debtor’s information and 
monitoring the debtor’s behavior, and the costs arising from lemon problems or moral 
hazard. It can be shown that the external finance premium, the wedge between the cost 
of external finance and internal finance, is an increasing function of the loans 
outstanding relative to the collateralizable net worth. Thus, the higher the debt burden is 
on firms, the higher the cost of external finance is, thereby leading to cut back of 
economic activities of the debtor.
1  
Secondly, under asymmetric information, managers’ interests can diverge from the 
shareholders’ interests and managers might pursue their own interests. An increase of 
debt to net worth raises external finance premium due to the associated increase in the 
probability of bankruptcy. Managers are more concerned with bankruptcy than 
shareholders, since it is quite likely in the case of bankruptcy that the managers are fired.   
Therefore, faced with increasing debt, managers will make every effort to cut back labor 
and investment to raise efficiency. This is a disciplinary role of debt.         
Thirdly, corporate debt can affect investment by creating debt overhang. Debt 
overhang is defined as deterrence of new investment due to the presence of debt 
outstanding. It occurs when the face value of debt outstanding is greater than its market 
value.  In this case some of the benefits from new investment will go to the existing 
creditors rather than to the new investors.
2    
Fourthly, bad loans can also cause problems. An increase of bad loans impairs the 
bank’s balance sheet. It raises the cost of external finance for the bank for the same 
reasons as were discussed above and thereby restrains the bank’s lending activity. It will   3
in turn exert a negative effect on the real activities of the bank-dependent borrowers.   
Based upon the theoretical developments on the relations between financial 
distress and the real economy, some studies examined empirically how the financial 
distress affected the Japanese economy. However, all of them are mainly concerned with 
the impact of financial distress on fixed investment.
3 It should be noted that the 
arguments held for fixed investment are perfectly applicable to employment since both 
fixed capital and labor are quasi-fixed in nature.
4  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of financial distress in 1990s on 
employment of Japanese firms quantitatively. Specifically, using firm-level micro data 
we estimate the extent to which firms’ employment is affected by high leverage in the 
corporate sector and bad loan problems in the banking sector.   
There are two novel features of this study. First of all, we analyze a rich panel data 
set that is constructed from the Annual Report of Financial Statements of Incorporated 
Business or Hojin Kigyo Tokei Nenpo of the Ministry of Finance(abbreviated as ARFS). 
It includes not only large firms listed in stock exchange but also unlisted small firms. 
The sample period covers the period of 1993 to 1998 that includes the financial turmoil 
that is often described as a “credit crunch” in Japan. There are no previous studies that 
investigate the impact of financial distress on employment by utilizing firm-level data 
including small firms. 
          Secondly, we deal with not only financial leverage in the corporate sector but also 
bad loan problems in the banking sector. Lingering bad loans on the banks’ balance 
sheet might lead to a reduction of bank loans, which might directly affect employment 
of bank-dependent firms. In general, it is quite difficult to estimate the effect of loan 
supply on employment from observed data of bank loans due to the identification 
problem of supply and demand conditions. Therefore it is necessary to select the 
variable purely representing the supply condition of loans. Fortunately the Bank of 
Japan  Tankan (Short-term Economic Survey of Corporations) records the diffusion 
index of ‘banks’ willingness to lend’ that can serve as a good proxy of the supply 
condition of loans. The data is available by industry and firm size, so that it is possible 
to test whether the impact of supply conditions of loans on employment varies across   4
firms with different size.   
     We preview our main findings of this study. First the firm’s ratio of debt to total 
asset exerts a significantly negative effect on employment of small firms. It is consistent 
with capital market imperfections story that suggests that the external finance premium 
is inversely associated with the collateralized net worth relative to loan size. Second, the 
lending attitude of financial institutions has significant effect on employment of small 
firms. It implies that bank health is important for employment of small firms that are 
bank-dependent. Therefore, mounting debt outstanding in the corporate sector as well as 
bad loans in the banking sector is partially responsible for cut back of employment of 
small firms in the 1990s.   
This paper is organized as follows. The next section sketches a derivation of 
dynamic labor demand function to be estimated from the intertemporal profit 
maximization of firms. Section 3 explains the procedure for constructing the panel data 
set along with the major characteristics of the obtained data set. Section 4 explains the 
estimation results and discusses the implications derived from them. Section 5 gives 
concluding remarks. 
         
2. Formulation of Employment Equation in an Intertemporal Optimization Framework   
The basic model of labor demand we rely upon is a dynamic model originally 
developed by Nickell(1986). The virtue of the model is that it has solid 
micro-foundations. Employment decisions are made in such a manner that the firm 
maximizes the present value of its earnings net of quadratic adjustment cost of 
hiring/firing labor. Then it can be shown that the actual employment is written, via a log 
approximation and the certainty equivalence results, as   
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  µ:stable root of the Euler equation of employment   5





α     and r is a real interest rate in terms of wages   
                     1 0 < <α  
 
Note that the speed of adjustment,  µ − 1 , decreases as the convexity of adjustment cost 
rises and that it is also affected by the discount factor  α .  
Eq.(1) is modified in several ways to obtain the employment equation to be 
estimated. First, we incorporate the existence of different types of labor with different 
adjustment costs. Then it can be shown that the aggregated employment equation has at 
least two lags on the dependent variable. Furthermore, the coefficient structure in the 
distributed lead term is much more complex than a simple geometric recursion. 
5 
Second, we specify the short-term equilibrium level of employment under the 
CES production function. When the production function is written as   
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            w h e r e   t K :capital stock at the beginning of period t 
                    t Y : real output in period t 
then the equilibrium employment level that maximizes the short-run profit for a 
competitive firm is given by   
 

























ρ                   ( 3 )  
            w h e r e   t w : nominal wage rate in period t 
                   t p :output price in period t 
 
      T h i r d ,  w e  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e  v a r i ables determining the short-run equilibrium 
employment have the following stochastic structures. 
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              w h e r e   wt yt ε ε ,   iid  stochastic  disturbances  
 
     Fourth, we approximate the degree of financial distress by two variables. One 
corresponds to the leverage of the firms and the other to the proxy of bad loan burden 
on banks. The former is represented by the ratio of debt to total assets ( t DEBT ) and the 
latter by the lending attitude of commercial banks ( t LEND ). It is expected that the 
harder the bad loan problem hits the bank, the more severe the bank’s lending attitude 
becomes. The degree of financial distress has an impact on employment through two 
channels. One is by changing the external finance premium facing the firm. High debt 
outstanding relative to total assets and/or severe lending attitude of banks raises the 
external finance premium under asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers, 
which in turn leads to an increase of effective interest rate or a decrease of discount 
factor  α . Note that the speed of adjustment is affected by the discount factor.   
  The other is a disciplinary role of debt. Firm managers have more incentive to 
cut employment when the debt asset ratio is high. In other words, faced with increasing 
debt, managers realize the adjustment cost of labor to be less convex. It implies that 
managers can adjust employment less costly.                 
     Substituting eqs.(3) and (4) into eq.(1) and taking an additional lag of the 
dependent variable and financial factors into consideration, we obtain the employment 
equation to be estimated as: 
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                 w h e r e   Nt ε : disturbance term   
      Note that the financial distress variables affect not only the employment level 
but also the adjustment process of employment.     7
  
3. Data Set Construction and its Characteristics   
     The panel data set we use is constructed from the Annual Report of Financial 
Statements of Incorporated Business or Hojin Kigyo Tokei Nenpo (ARFS) of the 
Ministry of Finance. It records individual items of firms’ balance sheet as well as profit 
and loss statement. The virtue of this data set is an extensive coverage of corporations 
with a variety of firm size for all the industries except financial and insurance industries. 
The coverage of firms is much wider than the firm database provided by NIKKEI and 
Development Bank of Japan, both of which include only the listed large firms.   
      The sample period covers the fiscal year of 1993 to 1998 including the period of 
financial turbulence in 1997 and 1998. The number of observations in the original data 
set is 26040, 26218, 26594, 25691, 25394, and 25505 in the period of 1993 to 1998, 
respectively. The ARFS is basically a cross-section data and the sampled firms whose 
equity capital are less than one billion yen are chosen randomly at the beginning of 
fiscal year and fixed for a year, although the sample includes all the firms whose equity 
capital are more than one billion yen. Fortunately, the ARFS has major items of firms’ 
balance sheet at the beginning of period as well as at the end of period. This overlapping 
nature of data series enables us to obtain a panel data set by comparing the 
beginning-of-period asset in the current period with the end-of-period asset in the 
previous year. When they coincide, it is inferred that they are generated from the same 
firm. Specifically, comparison is made between the beginning-of-period value in the 
current period and the end-of-period value in the previous year for three items of firm’s 
balance sheet: total assets, tangible fixed assets excluding land, and total borrowings.   
The total number of firms consistently available during the whole sample period 
is 3044. The industry classification of the sampled firms is shown in Table 1.
6 The 
number of manufacturing firms is 1463(48.1%) and the rest belong to 
non-manufacturing industries (51.9%). The price we have to pay for obtaining the panel 
data set is to discard the firms discontinuously sampled, most of which are small firms. 
Figure 1 and 2 show histograms of equity capital and number of employees of the 
constructed panel data set in 1993, respectively. The proportion of firms whose equity   8
capital is less than 1 billion yen is 30.9 % for our sample, while it is 82.8 % for the 
original data set. As for the distribution of employees, the proportion of firms with 
employees less than 100 is 14.4 % for our sample, while it is 62.7 % for the original 
data set.
7 This suggests that the histogram of equity capital as well as the number of 
employees is much more skewed to the right for the constructed data set than for the 
original one. In fact the median of equity capital and the number of employees is 1664 
million yen and 529 for the constructed data set, while they are 99 million yen and 42 
for the original data set.       
Now we describe the procedure to construct the variables used in estimation. 
The employment variable  () t N  is measured by the number of employees excluding 
directors. Real output is measured by real value-added, which is the sum of current 
profits, salaries for staffs, welfare expenses, interest and discounting expenses, rental 
fees of tangible assets and land, taxes, and depreciation allowance. The nominal 
value-added is deflated by the industry value-added deflator. The wage rate is computed 
as the sum of salaries for employees and welfare expenses divided by the number of 
employees. We obtain the real wage rate by dividing the nominal figure by the industry 
value-added deflator. The debt-asset ratio is defined as the ratio of borrowings and 
bonds payable to total assets at the beginning of period. The lending attitude of financial 
institutions is taken from the Short-term Economic Survey of All Enterprises called 
Tankan, conducted by the Bank of Japan. It is the diffusion index and represents the 
proportion of entrepreneurs feeling the present lending attitude of financial institutions 
to be  “accommodative” minus those feeling the present lending attitude of financial 
institutions to be “ severe”. The data are available by industries and three firm-size 
groups (small, medium and large firm group) classified by regular employees. 
     Table 2 shows the median and mean values of real value-added, number of 
employees, real wage rate, and the ratio of debt to total assets over the whole sample 
period for manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. The mean value is much 
higher than the median value especially for real value-added and number of employees, 
implying that the distribution of these variables is skewed to the right. The mean and 
median values of real value-added, number of employees, and real wage rate are larger   9
for manufacturing industries than for non-manufacturing industries. On the contrary, the 
debt-asset ratio is higher for non-manufacturing industries. 
          Figure 3 shows the diffusion index of lending attitude of financial institutions for 
three firm groups in the period of 1993 to 1999. It is clear that the lending attitude 
becomes very severe in the last quarter of 1997. Note that large financial institutions 
such as Yamaichi Securities and The Hokkaido Takushoku Bank went into bankruptcy 
on November in 1997. The proportion of “severe” respondents exceeded that of 
“ accommodative” respondents starting in the first quarter of 1998.   
 
4. Impact of Financial Distress on Employment: Quantitative Evaluation 
     Eq.(5) is estimated in a first-differenced form by the two-step GMM estimation 
proposed by Arellano and Bond(1991). The instruments we use are logarithm of thrice 
and fourth lagged employment, twice to fourth lagged logarithm of real value-added and 
real wages, once to fourth lagged debt-asset ratio and lending attitude of financial 
institutions and the cross terms of logarithm of thrice and fourth lagged employment 
with the corresponding lagged debt-asset ratio and lending attitude of financial 
institutions. Estimation is conducted for four cases classified by industry 
(manufacturing and non-manufacturing) and firm size (small to medium-sized firms and 
large firms).  The large firms are defined as those whose equity capital in 1993 are 
larger than 1 billion yen.   
 
Basic Results 
Table 3 shows the estimation results.  Real value-added has a significantly 
positive effect on employment, irrespective of industry and firm size. Real wage rate 
also exerts a significantly negative effect on employment for all firm groups in 
manufacturing as well as non-manufacturing industries. As for the effect of financial 
distress on employment, the debt-asset ratio has a significantly negative effect on 
employment for small firms in manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. 
However, the manner in which debt-asset ratio affects employment differs between 
these two sectors. For manufacturing industries debt-asset ratio exerts a negative effect   10
on the adjustment process of labor. That is to say, higher debt-asset ratio increases the 
speed of adjusting employment toward equilibrium level. On the other hand, the 
debt-asset ratio directly affects the current level of employment negatively for 
non-manufacturing industries.   
Lending attitude has a statistically positive effect on employment for all firm 
groups, irrespective of industry. The response pattern of employment to lending attitude 
is somewhat similar to that of employment to debt-asset ratio. Severe lending attitude 
raises the adjustment speed of employment for all firm groups in manufacturing 
industries and large firms in non-manufacturing industries, while severe lending attitude 
leads to direct reduction of current employment for small firm group in 
non-manufacturing industries. We will discuss later why small firms, in particular for 
non-manufacturing industries, responds quickly to financial distress. 
 
Quantitative Evaluation of the Impact of Financial Distress on Employment 
     Now we evaluate quantitatively the impact of financial distress on employment 
by comparing the employment pattern across firms with different debt structure and 
facing different lending attitudes of financial institutions. Our empirical strategy to 
accomplish this purpose is to conduct the following four numerical exercises. The first 
exercise we make is to compute how much current employment is reduced when the 
debt-asset ratio increases. Table 4 shows the percentage change in current employment 
by firm size for selected industries when the debt-asset ratio rises from the 1
st quartile to 
the 3
rd quartile in 1998. Employment is substantially reduced for small firms in 
non-manufacturing industries. For instance, employment is reduced by 36.6 percent for 
small real estate firms. The percentage change in employment of small firms in 
manufacturing industries is second largest, hovering around 1-2 percent, although it is 
by far smaller than that of counterparts in non-manufacturing industries. The change in 
employment of large firm groups is much smaller than that of small firm groups.   
          In the second exercise, we compute how much current employment changes when 
lending attitude becomes severe. Table 5 shows the percentage change in current 
employment by firm size for selected industries when lending attitude changes from   11
1996 that is a relatively accommodative year to 1998 when credit contracted severely. 
Employment is reduced by between 1.3 and 2.6 percent for small firms.     
      The third exercise is to compare the adjustment process of employment across 
firms with different debt structure when a temporary shock hits the firm. Specifically we 
compare the future adjustment paths of employment generated by a one-standard-error 
increase in the employment equation residual between a firm with the 1
st quartile 
debt-asset ratio in 1998 and a firm with the 3
rd quartile debt-asset ratio in 1998. The 
exercise is conducted by firm size for four manufacturing industries (chemicals, 
machinery, electrical machinery and transport equipment) and four non-manufacturing 
industries (construction, wholesale trade, retail trade and real estate). The results reveal 
that the higher the debt-asset ratio is, the quicker the adjustment of employment toward 
equilibrium, but the difference is not large quantitatively. In fact, for manufacturing 
industries the difference is at most 7 basis points (1
st to 2
nd year after the shock in 
electrical machinery) for small firms and 4 basis points (2
nd year after the shock in 
electrical machinery). As for non-manufacturing industries, the difference is at most 8 
basis points (2
nd year after the shock in real estate) and 3 basis points (1
st to 2
nd year 
after the shock in real estate).
8  
      The last exercise is to compare the adjustment process of employment across 
firms facing different lending attitudes when a temporary shock hits the firm. We 
compare the dynamic path of employment generated by a one-standard-error increase in 
the employment equation residual between a firm facing severe lending attitude and a 
firm facing accommodative lending attitude.
9  The exercise is conducted by firm size for 
the same industries in the third exercise. The results indicate that the more severe the 
lending attitude is, the quicker the firm adjusts employment toward equilibrium, but the 
difference is by no means large. For manufacturing industries the difference is at most 6 
basis points (1
st year after the shock in chemicals) for small firms and 3 basis points (2
nd 
year after the shock in machinery). For non-manufacturing industries, the difference is 
at most 3 basis points for small firms (2
nd year after the shock in construction, wholesale 
trade and real estate) and large firms (1
st year after the shock in construction, wholesale 
trade and real estate).     12
      To sum up, increase in debt-asset ratio reduces the current level of employment 
for small firms substantially, but not for large firms. Higher debt-asset ratio raises the 
adjustment speed of employment irrespective of firm size and industry, but it is not 
quantitatively large. The same holds true for the impact of lending attitude on 
employment.   
 
Interpretations of Our Findings 
Our findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction that financial distress 
might exert a negative effect on employment. Moreover, the finding that the impact of 
financial distress on employment is much stronger for small firms is reasonably 
interpreted as follows. First, the external finance premium might be raised higher by the 
debt-asset ratio for small firms since large firms have large collateralizable net worth 
that helps to diversify unobservable idiosyncratic risk, while small firms do not.
10 
Moreover, a number of large firms in Japan belong to industry groups known as keiretsu, 
where main bank plays a central role in mitigating the informational asymmetry 
between lenders and borrowers, while small firms have relatively loose ties with main 
banks. Aoki(1994) argues that main bank system is institutionally complementary with 
the Japanese employment system where employees embodying firm-specific training 
are kept within a firm over quite the long term. Moreover, large firms tend to retain a 
higher proportion of employees with firm-specific training, which is confirmed by the 
following table. Table 6 shows the average length of service of employees by firm size 
for selected industries. The average length of service is used as a proxy of the extent to 
which firm-specific training is prevalent in an industry. We can see from the table that 
the average length of service is shorter for small firms, irrespective of industry. The 
upshot is that labor resources of large firms that embody firm-specific training fluctuate 
less by the temporary adverse shock since the main banks support the troubled firms 
financially.
11 We can give direct empirical evidence to support this line of argument. 
Figure 4 shows the dynamic response of employment to a temporary fall of sales by 10 
percent for small and large firm groups in electrical machinery and real estate 
industries.
12  It is clear from the figure that the adjustment is much smoother and slower   13
for  large  firm  groups.         
Second, disciplinary role of debt might be more potent for small firms since the 
managers of small firms on the verge of bankruptcy feel threatened by the cut of bank 
loans and/or are easily fired by their parent firms. Therefore the managers of small firms 
have good reasons for making every effort to reduce employment to improve efficiency 
of production. Third, small firms are more bank-dependent, so that lending attitude of 
banks has much stronger effect on employment.         
 
Robustness of Our Findings 
     Now we examine in two different ways the robustness of our findings that 
financial distress has an adverse effect on employment. First we re-estimate the 
employment equation by respecifying the short-run equilibrium employment level. In 
general the employment level maximizing the short-run profit is expressed as a function 
of real wage rate and capital stock at the beginning of period ( t K ). In other words, it is 
written in a logarithmic form as 
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We assume that the capital stock has the following stochastic structure. 
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Then we obtain the following employment equation to be estimated.
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Capital stock is defined as the tangible fixed asset excluding land divided by the 
investment goods deflator in the year when the capital stock was installed. The 
installation year of the capital stock is identified by the information of the average years 
elapsed since installation, which is taken from the 1998 White Paper on the Japanese 
Economy. Table 7 shows the estimation results of eq.(8). The results are essentially 
unaltered. The debt-asset ratio exerts a negative effect on employment for small firms in 
both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. For manufacturing industries the 
debt-asset ratio affects employment in the course of adjusting employment toward 
equilibrium, while it has a direct effect on the current level of employment for 
non-manufacturing industries. Lending attitude of financial institutions exerts a positive 
effect on employment irrespective of firm size and industry. Lending attitude affects the 
current level of employment for small firms in both manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing industries.
14  On the other hand, lending attitude has a positive effect 
on employment through altering the adjustment process for large firms in manufacturing 
as well as non-manufacturing industries.   
     Secondly we employ an alternative measure of financial leverage of firms. We 
define a flow version of firms’ leverage ( t DEBTF ) as the interest and discount paid 
divided by the sum of operating profit and depreciation allowances. Note that this 
variable is inversely related to the interest coverage ratio. Estimation results with new 
leverage variable instead of the stock leverage variable are shown in Table 8. The 
impact of lending attitude on employment remains positive for all firm groups in 
manufacturing as well as non-manufacturing industries, but it is only for small firm 
group in manufacturing industries that firm’s leverage exerts a significantly negative 
effect on employment. It appears that the flow leverage variable is a poor proxy for the 
firm’s true debt structure. In fact, the correlation coefficient between the flow variable 
of firm’s leverage and the stock counterpart is only 0.1534.   
 
5.Concluding Remarks 
      This study examined empirically the impact of financial distress in 1990s on 
employment using the panel data of Japanese firms. We confirmed that financial distress   15
had an adverse effect on employment of small firms. In a companion paper 
(Ogawa(2001)), we also found that financial distress affected fixed investment of small 
firms negatively. Putting these findings together, it is clear that financial distress in the 
corporate sector as well as the banking sector led to a reduction of demand for 
quasi-fixed inputs. It should be noted that quasi-fixed factors embody a new technology 
that raises efficiency of production. To attain the sustained long-run growth, reducing 
the corporate debt and wiping out the banks’ bad loans is an urgent agenda for the 
Japanese  economy.       
   16
 
                                                 
Footnotes 
 
1  There is a growing body of literature on this issue. See Hubbard (1998) for a survey 
of investment behavior under capital market imperfections. 
 
2  See Myers(1977) and Hart(1995) for more detailed discussion on debt overhang. 
 
3  Ogawa et al. (1996), Suzuki and Ogawa (1997) and Ogawa and Suzuki (1998) 
examine empirically the effects of collateralizable net worth or land on corporate 
investment. As for the effects of the bank’s balance sheet conditions on corporate 
investment, Gibson(1995 and 1997) and Kang and Stulz(2000) conduct direct tests of 
the impact of bank health on investment activities. The former studies found that the 
impact of bank health on investment was small; while the latter found that more 
bank-dependent firms invested less in early 1990s. Motonishi and Yoshikawa (1999) 
and Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000) show that bank lending exerts a significant effect on 
investment. Using the Bank of Japan diffusion index of ‘banks’ willingness to lend,’ 
Motonishi and Yoshikawa obtain the evidence that bank lending is a significant 
determinant of business investment of small firms, but not large firms. Ogawa and 
Kitasaka also show that expenditures on fixed investment are sensitively affected by 
bank loans for small firms that do not have close substitutes of bank loans. Based upon 
the firm-level data, Ogawa(2001) found that the ratio of debt to total assets exerted a 
negative effect on fixed investment for small firms and that lending attitude of financial 
institutions affected fixed investment, irrespective of firm size. 
 
4  Lange et al.(1996) and Nickell and Nicolitsas(1999) find a negative relation between 
leverage and employment for the U.S. and U.K., respectively. Cantor(1990) and 
Sharpe(1994) find that employment growth at highly leveraged firms is more sensitive 
to demand and financial market conditions for the U.S. For Japan, as far as the author 
knows, Tomiyama(2001) is the only study that examines empirically a relation between 
leverage and speed of adjusting labor, using the panel data of firms.     
 
5  See Nickell(1986) pp.509-510 for more detailed discussions.   
 
6  We exclude the firms in agriculture, forestry, fishery and mining industries since the 
data of lending attitude of financial institution are not available for these industries. We 
also exclude the firms in electric power and gas industries due to regulatory nature of 
these industries.   
 
7  It should be noted that even if the proportion of small firms in our sample is lower 
than that in the original data set, it is much higher than the other studies. For example, 
the proportion of firms with employees less than 100 is only 1 % in Tomiyama(2001). 
 
8  The one-standard-error increase in the employment equation residual corresponds to 
0.0841, 0.0896, 0.1859, and 0.1375 for small and large firms in manufacturing   17
                                                                                                                                               
industries and small and large firms in non-manufacturing industries, respectively. 
 
9  The severe lending attitude is represented by the cross terms of lagged lending 
attitude in 1998 and 1997 with lagged employment, while the accommodative lending 
attitude is represented by the cross terms of lagged lending attitude in 1996 and 1995 
with lagged employment.   
 
10  Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) emphasize that asymmetric information problems are 
more severe for small firms than for large firms. See Berger and Udell (1998) for a 
comprehensive survey of small business finance. 
 
11  Abe(1999). Tomiyama(2001) and Urasaka and Noda(2001) examine empirically 
whether employment fluctuations are mitigated for the firms with strong ties with main 
banks. Their findings are generally in the affirmative.     
 
12  In computing the dynamic response of employment, we use the lagged lending 
attitude and industry-median debt-asset ratios in 1998 and 1997.   
   
13  This equation corresponds to the basic employment specification adopted by Nickell 
and Nicolitsas(1999).   
  
14  Note that in the previous specification lending attitude affects employment via 






                          Table 1 Number of Firms in Our Sample
Number of firms
Manufacturing
Food and beverages 142
Textiles 41
Wearing apparels and clothing accessaries 8
Wood and wooden products 8
Pulp, paper and paper products 27
Publishing and printing 19
Chemicals 241
Petroleum and coal products 25
Non-metallic mineral products 53
Iron and steel 59
Non-ferrous metals 61
Fabricated metal products 76
Machinery 165
Electrical machinery, equipment and supplies 245
Transport equipment 116
Precision instruments 44









Other transportation and communications 124
Services for business activities 115
Hotels and lodging 64
Personal service activities 10




Data source: Ministry of Finance, Annual Report of Financial Statements 










     Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Major Variable in Our Sample
                Sample means
Manufacturing Non-manufacturing
Real value-added 27027.3 20019.5
(7158.2) (5207.8)
Number of employees 1678 1340
(610) (402)
Real wage rate 7.4 6.4
(6.9) (5.2)
Ratio of debt to total assets 0.2876 0.3705
(0.2581) (0.3124)
Notes: Real value-added and real wage rate are obtained by dividing
the corresponding nominal figures by the industry valu-added deflator
(1990=1.0)  (Unit: million yen). 
The wage rate is per annum.
The figures in parentheses are sample medians.Table 3 Estimation Results of Dynamic Labor Demand (1):
Basic Case
        Lagged dependent variable Debt-asset ratio Lending attitude of
One-period lagged Two-period lagged One-period lagged Two-period lagged One-period lagged Two-period lagged financial institutions
x debt-asset ratio x debt-asset ratio x lending attitude x lending attitude
Manufacturing 
Small firms 0.1178 0.1252 -0.0150 -0.0135 0.0182 -0.0116 -0.0039 0.0690
(1.54) (4.57) (-2.48) (-2.49) (2.13) (-1.25) (-0.10) (1.19)
Large firms 0.4229 0.0579 -0.0087 -0.0057 -0.0027 0.0158 0.0366 -0.0098
(5.83) (1.48) (-1.49) (-0.97) (-0.64) (2.79) (0.23) (-0.24)
Non-manufacturing
Small firms -0.0313 0.1668 0.0003 -0.0082 0.0009 0.0079 -0.6801 0.0518
(-0.24) (2.36) (0.02) (-0.77) (0.23) (0.89) (-5.37) (3.66)
Large firms 0.3990 0.0438 -0.0040 -0.0004 0.0033 -0.0009 -0.0040 0.0058
(6.33) (1.05) (-0.51) (-0.06) (2.11) (-0.20) (-0.08) (0.34)
 
              Real wage rate Real value-added J-statistics
Current One-period lagged p-value
Manufacturing 
Small firms -0.3829 0.0064 0.2990 30.2561
(-4.97) (0.19) (4.40) (0.78)
Large firms -0.2052 0.1271 0.0934 48.3142
(-2.55) (2.09) (1.83) (0.10)
Non-manufacturing
Small firms -0.0557 -0.0801 0.2604 32.9297
(-1.90) (-1.35) (2.70) (0.66)
Large firms -0.3190 0.0049 0.1753 29.9524
(-3.21) (0.11) (2.76) (0.79)
Notes: The figures in parentheses are the ratio of coefficient estimate to its standard error.Table 4
Change in Current Employment by an Increase of Debt-asset Ratio
               from the 1st to the 3rd Quartile in 1998
(%)




Electrical machinery -1.89 1.10
Transport equipment -1.12 0.90
Non-manufacturing
Construction -18.53 -0.13
Wholesale trade -19.70 -0.13
Retail trade -24.85 -0.15
Real Estate -36.55 -0.22
Table 5
Change in Current Employment When Lending Attitude Changes 
from 1996 to 1998
(%)




Electrical machinery -2.20 0.35
Transport equipment -2.16 0.58
Non-manufacturing
Construction -1.76 -0.35
Wholesale trade -1.78 -0.39
Retail trade -1.27 -0.31








Manufacturing 10.9 12.9 17.0
Construction 10.1 12.4 16.4
Wholesale trade 9.8 10.9 13.2
 and retail trade
Real estate 7.4 8.9 10.1
Data Source: Basic Survey on Wage Structure 1998, 
Ministry of Labour 
Table 7 Estimation Results of Dynamic Labor Demand (2):
Alternative Specification of Short-run Equilibrium Employment
        Lagged dependent variable Debt-asset ratio Lending attitude of
One-period lagged Two-period lagged One-period lagged Two-period lagged One-period lagged Two-period lagged financial institutions
x debt-asset ratio x debt-asset ratio x lending attitude x lending attitude
Manufacturing 
Small firms 0.2214 0.0459 -0.0188 -0.0149 0.0148 0.0063 -0.0440 0.1109
(2.51) (0.90) (-2.97) (-1.90) (1.34) (0.55) (-0.87) (1.81)
Large firms 0.2469 0.0344 -0.0115 -0.0002 0.0029 0.0098 -0.0858 -0.0248
(4.08) (0.91) (-2.08) (-0.04) (0.77) (1.81) (-0.61) (-0.65)
Non-manufacturing
Small firms 0.1535 0.2352 0.0028 -0.0133 0.0003 0.0060 -0.5076 0.0336
(1.27) (3.11) (0.26) (-1.24) (0.08) (0.69) (-4.35) (1.96)
Large firms 0.2992 0.1795 -0.0103 0.0004 0.0034 -0.0034 0.0210 0.0061
(4.41) (2.89) (-0.99) (0.06) (2.19) (-0.71) (0.49) (0.34)
 
              Real wage rate Capital stock J-statistics
Current One-period lagged p-value
Manufacturing 
Small firms -0.2599 0.0493 -0.0589 48.2933
(-3.96) (1.35) (-1.41) (0.15)
Large firms -0.1246 0.0521 0.1729 42.4706
(-2.15) (0.96) (2.71) (0.32)
Non-manufacturing
Small firms -0.0986 -0.0455 0.0460 30.0471
(-1.60) (-0.84) (1.05) (0.85)
Large firms -0.1411 -0.0886 0.0494 37.1049
(-1.26) (-1.85) (1.39) (0.56)
Notes: The figures in parentheses are the ratio of coefficient estimate to its standard error.  
 Table 8 Estimation Results of Dynamic Labor Demand (3):
Flow measure of leverage ratio
        Lagged dependent variable Interest and discounts Lending attitude of
One-period lagged Two-period lagged One-period lagged Two-period lagged One-period lagged Two-period lagged paid/ operating profits financial institutions
x debt-asset ratio x debt-asset ratio x lending attitude x lending attitude plus depreciation
Manufacturing 
Small firms 0.1397 0.0959 0.0287 -0.0190 0.0191 -0.0030 0.1686 0.0511
(2.00) (3.75) (1.26) (-1.78) (2.13) (-0.33) (0.75) (0.90)
Large firms 0.4225 0.0273 0.0487 0.0013 -0.0022 0.0192 -0.4135 -0.0331
(4.69) (0.67) (2.52) (0.17) (-0.48) (2.88) (-1.39) (-0.78)
Non-manufacturing
Small firms 0.3146 0.1383 0.0411 -0.0067 0.0079 0.0148 0.3644 0.0199
(2.77) (1.78) (1.14) (-0.49) (1.70) (1.23) (1.27) (1.03)
Large firms 0.4196 0.0543 0.0056 0.0053 0.0048 0.0033 0.7015 0.0161
(5.97) (1.10) (0.28) (0.70) (2.42) (0.66) (2.46) (0.81)
 
              Real wage rate Capital stock J-statistics
Current One-period lagged p-value
Manufacturing 
Small firms -0.3863 0.0094 0.3101 35.4400
(-4.71) (0.28) (4.40) (0.45)
Large firms -0.0767 0.1114 0.0244 36.4920
(-0.86) (1.79) (0.45) (0.40)
Non-manufacturing
Small firms -0.1508 -0.0218 0.4071 28.5001
(-1.90) (-0.37) (3.45) (0.77)
Large firms -0.3930 0.0291 0.2023 30.7458
(-3.76) (0.50) (2.98) (0.67)
Notes: The figures in parentheses are the ratio of coefficient estimate to its standard error.
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Source:  Bank of Japan：  Short-term Economic Survey of Enterprises (Tankan) 
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Figure 4-2 Adjustment Process of Employment to Sales Shock:
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